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Abstract 
Information Security Governance (ISG) is an important discipline that addresses information security 
at a strategic level providing strategic direction, optimized use of information resources and proper 
security incident management. ISG and the impact of poor security incident management have 
attracted much attention in the literature but unfortunately there is little empirical evidence regarding 
the explicit link between ISG and its effectiveness in terms of reducing negative impacts on business 
objectives from security incidents. Consequently, little exploration of ISG factors and their impact on 
the above mentioned measure of effectiveness exists. Further, to direct endeavors the crucial question 
is if there exist any differences in how effective these factors are in attaining this target. Currently, 
there is a lack in research considering this question. The research presented in this article explores 
the ISG domain further by empirically examine 30 ISG factors and their ability of reducing negative 
impacts on business objectives from security incidents. Data has been collected by surveying ISG 
experts. Ten factors were identified to have significant different means in relation to other factors 
according to a one-way ANOVA analysis that was conducted. The results give an indication on what 
ISG factors that have an effect, providing both support for further academic research and also 
decision support for implementing ISG. 
Keywords: Information security governance, information security governance factors, Expert survey. 
 
1 Introduction 
Business information can unquestionably be considered as an extremely important asset to any 
organization. Therefore, protecting business information is a high priority throughout many industries. 
A survey conducted in 2006 by the British Government Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
showed that a nine-tenth of the organizations rated information security as important (Calder and 
Watkins, 2008). A study performed by the Texas AM University showed that 93% of companies that 
lost their data centre for 10 days or more due to a security incident filed for bankruptcy one year after 
the incident. 50% of businesses that found themselves without data management for this same time 
period filed for bankruptcy immediately (Moskal, 2008). As the result of a security incident can 
severely harm or even destruct an organization, it is imperative that organizations must make every 
effort to ensure that their business information is protected against the growing range of threats that is 
arrayed against this information, and if incidents due occur also ensure that corrective actions are 
taken to reduce negative impacts on business objectives.  
However, recovering from a security incident in an effective way is a complex task and requires an 
effective management of information resources and that everybody in the organization partakes in a 
comprehensive process of managing the incident (Von Solms and Von Solms, 2006). Indeed, the still 
ever increasing reports of organizations suffering from fatal consequences from an incident suggest 
that organizations are still failing to manage security incidents effectively. One reason for this is that 
in the ever changing and complex IT environment, simply applying technical countermeasure to 
recover from incidents is no longer adequate (Calder and Watkins, 2008). Another reason is that 
information security traditionally has been seen as a technical job and best left to the technicians 
(Entrust, 2004). Fortunately, this image has significantly changed, and nowadays it is well-known that 
the responsibility for information security starts right at the top, and propagates right down to the 
operational level (Von Solms 2005a). Information Security Governance (ISG) addresses information 
security at a strategic level from a top-down approach and provides structure and relational 
mechanisms to ensure security in a holistic fashion (Johnston and Hale, 2009). ISG is further 
beneficial to an organization by providing: (i) strategic direction so that objectives are achieved, (ii) 
proper security incident management, (iii), responsible usage of information resources, and (iv) 
optimized information security investments. These examples are far from absolute and the list can be 
made much longer. However, they emphasize the benefits an organization can gain when 
implementing enterprise ISG (ISACA, 2006; Okhil et al. 2009; Von Solms, 2005a).  
The role and importance of ISG and the severity of poor incident management have attracted much 
attention in the literature but unfortunately much of the literature has focused on technical and 
operational aspects (Sipponen and Kukkonen, 2007). There is further little empirical evidence 
regarding the explicit link between ISG and its effectiveness in terms of reducing negative impacts on 
business objectives from a security incident. Consequently, little exploration of ISG factors (e.g. IT 
security policies are enforced, Security vulnerabilities and incidents are identified, monitored and 
reported and cost-effective action plans for critical IT risks) and their impact on the above mentioned 
measure of effectiveness exists. This paper seeks on bridging this gap in the academic literature by 
empirically examine 30 ISG factors and their effectiveness in terms of reducing negative impacts from 
incidents. Empirical data has been collected through a survey distributed to experts in the ISG domain 
in which they report their opinions on the effectiveness of ISG factors. This paper does not aim to 
reach in-depth regarding each of the investigated factors; it rather aims at gaining an understanding of 
the relative impact of these factors and thus provides empirical input of potential relationship between 
factors and their impact open for discussion and other researchers might find interesting hypotheses to 
test in their work. The paper, further investigate a broad range of ISG factors but only their impact on 
reducing negative impacts on business objectives and not on proactive effectiveness, i.e. preventing 
attacks before they lead to incidents which causes impacts on the business. This question is left open 
for future research. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature and the 
research model of the study. In section 3 the methodology used in the study is presented. Section 4 
presents and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 Literature review and research model 
This section aims to present a discussion of the literature with regard to ISG and the consequences of a 
security incident. The section further presents the research model of the study, which includes ISG 
factors and the negative consequences of a security incident that these factors aim to reduce. 
2.1 Information Security Governance 
The term information security governance (ISG) describes the process of how information security is 
addressed at an executive level (Posthumus and Von Solms, 2004). Von Solms (2005a) defines ISG as 
“management commitment and leadership, organizational structures, user awareness and commitment, 
policies, procedures, processes, technologies and compliance enforcement mechanisms, all working 
together to ensure that the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of the company’s electronic 
assets (data, information, software, hardware, people, etc.) are maintained at all times”. 
According to the Corporate Governance Task Force (2004) ISG should be considered to be a facet of 
an organization’s broader corporate governance strategy established by the Board, which is also 
responsible and accountable to the shareholders of the company and, therefore, they must ensure that 
their organization produces business value and delivers a suitable return on shareholder investment 
(King Report, 2001). Good ISG enables an organization to effectively fulfill all the internal and 
external requirements in terms of protecting business information assets and will most assuredly help 
to generate this return (Posthumus and Von Solms, 2004). 
The academic literature in the area of ISG is far from extensive and established as its related concept 
corporate governance and IT governance. The literature that exists does in general highlight the 
importance of ISG and gives normative recommendations on how information security governance 
should be conducted. For instance, Von Solms (2001) and Moulton and Coles (2003) discusses the 
direct link between corporate governance and information security. These papers emphasize the 
importance of information security management as a part of both corporate - and IT governance and 
further guide directors and business managers in corporations of all sizes on how to ensure that 
business requirements are met and that their IT strategy is coordinated, coherent, structured, 
comprehensive, and cost-effective. 
Other studies in the area of ISG cover general implementations of ISG programs in organizations and 
the role of frameworks and methodologies in Information Security Management and governance 
(Herath et al., 2009) and (Tabor, 2009). 
Guidelines that are usually regarded as “pure” information security (e.g. ISO 27000) and “pure” IT 
governance (e.g. CobiT) frameworks have been discussed for ISG purposes in the literature by Von 
Solms (2005). The idea is that if these guidelines are followed, the security of the addressed system or 
organization will be increased. Looking at them from this point of view, they can thus be seen as 
theory for how to implement, manage and control ISG. A problem with them is however that they do 
not provide information about dependencies between different promoted features and goals to fulfill. 
For instance, the question to what degree certain factors impact the fulfillment of the goal to reduce 
negative impacts from security incidents has not been analyzed. To the author knowledge there is 
currently a lack of empirical data considering this question. Additionally, research on ISG factors in 
general and as earlier argued, factors to consider when planning ISG in a top-down approach in 
particular does not exist to a large extent. 
2.2 Consequences of a security incident 
Information security measures can be categorized into proactive and reactive measures. Proactive 
means that preventive measures have been applied to secure data or resources before a security 
incident can occur. Reactive means that curing measures are being applied to secure data or resources 
as soon as a security incident is detected (Venter and Eloff, 2003). In this paper the focus lays more on 
the reactive efforts to secure business information so that negative impacts on business objectives can 
be avoided, and as earlier argued, these impacts can be devastating for an organization. For an 
organization loss of business data is devastating as it can be considered to be an extremely important 
asset to any organization (Posthumus and Von Solms, 2004). (Halliday et al., 1996) goes even further 
by claiming that an organization’s information resources are the lifeblood of that organization  
When information technology is managed effectively, business information produced by these 
technologies can help an organization achieving competitive advantage over others, which produces 
business value and keeps shareholders and other investors satisfied. The business information can 
further be used, by top executives, to base the making of the numerous critical business decisions. It is 
therefore critical that this information has been kept confidential, accurate and timely. If any of these 
characteristics of information has been compromised due to a security incident there is a risk that the 
management team makes ill-advised decisions which could have a significantly devastating impact on 
the overall well-being of the organization. This could lead to huge negative impacts such as financial 
loss and even the tarnishing of an organization’s corporate reputation (Entrust, 2004).  
These consequences indicate how important it is for an organization to have an effective process of 
managing incidents to avoid fatal consequences on business objectives. In order to protect sensitive 
business information from the various incidents that potentially affect it, it is important to understand 
from what sources these incidents may arise. In general, a security incident arises from an agent 
seeking to exploit one or several vulnerabilities in an organization’s information assets using a tool 
(e.g. physical attack, Dsniff). The agent further performs an attack, and if the attack is successful, a 
security incident (e.g. Denial of service, Social Engineering, Remote Execution) is caused (Santos 
Moreira, et. al., 2008). The security incident implies to a negative impact on business objectives (e.g. 
loss of business, reputational damage, operational disruption, privacy breach in the assets affecting the 
business). 
To avoid these negative impacts it is critical for organizations to establish clear procedures for 
assessing the current and potential business impact of incidents, and implement effective methods of 
collecting, analyzing, and reporting data (NIST, 2004)(ISACA, 2006). Further, building relationships 
and establishing suitable means of communication with other internal groups (e.g., human resources, 
legal) and with external groups (e.g., other incident response teams, law enforcement) are also vital. 
Information security governance can support the achievement of building these capabilities in an 
organization. This paper therefore bases its research model on ISG factors and how these reduce 
negative impacts on business objectives.  
2.3 Research model  
For the purpose of studying if there exist any differences in how effective ISG factors are in attaining 
the goal of reducing negative impacts from security incidents; this study proposes to investigate the 
research model presented in figure 1. 30 factors are studied to assess their relative strength in reducing 
negative impacts from an incident. The general idea is that if these factors are implemented 
effectively, it is likely that an effective ISG program is in place to reduce negative impacts on the 
business. To achieve a sufficient degree of content validity the studied factors were retrieved from 
well-established best-practice literature (Von Solms, 2005b)(Brown and Nasuti, 2005). These are 
presented in the document “Information Security Governance: Guidance for Board of directors and 
Executive management 2nd Edition”. In table 1, the studied factors are outlined. Each factor is also 




Factor 30Factor 29...Factor 2
Reduces Reduces Reduces Reduces Reduces
 
Figure 1. The research model of the study 
 
Factor 
1 IT security costs, benefits, strategy, policies and service levels are transparent and made understandable. 
2 A common and comprehensive set of IT security policies are developed. 
3 The IT strategy, policies and control framework are communicated 
4 IT security policies are enforced 
5 Security incidents in business impact terms are defined 
6 The business impact of risks to IT objectives and resources is made clear. 
7 An IT continuity plan that supports business continuity plans is established 
8 The likelihood and impact of IT security risks are established and reduced 
9 Regular risk assessments with senior managers and key staff are performed 
10 Only authorized users are permitted to access critical and sensitive data 
11 Critical and confidential information are withheld from those who should not have access to it 
12 Security vulnerabilities and incidents are identified, monitored and reported 
13 IT continuity plans that can be executed, tested and maintained are developed 
14 The integrity of information and processing infrastructure is maintained 
15 Making sure that IT services and infrastructure can resist and recover from failures due to error, deliberate 
attack or disaster 
16 Making sure of proper use and performance of the applications and technology solutions 
17 The number of incidents damaging reputation with the public is measured 
18 The number of systems where security requirements are not met is measured 
19 The number and type of suspected and actual access violations is measured 
20 The number and type of malicious code prevented is measured 
21 The number and type of security incidents is measured 
22 The number and type of obsolete accounts is measured 
23 The number of unauthorized IP addresses, ports and traffic types denied is measured 
24 The number of access rights authorized, revoked, reset or changed is measured 
25 Making sure that automated business transactions and information exchanges can be trusted 
26 Making sure that IT services are available as required 
27 Minimizing the probability of IT service interruption 
28 Minimizing the impact of security vulnerabilities and incidents 
29 Making sure of minimum business impact in the event of an IT service disruption or change 
30 Establish cost-effective action plans for critical IT risks 
Table 1. The studied information security governance factors 
 
In order to assess the relative impact of these factors, IT experts were surveyed. The next section 
describes the methodology used for this purpose 
3 Method 
This study utilizes a survey as a measurement tool, this due to the obvious strengths in terms of 
statistical analysis and cost efficiency. The aim of the study is not to reach in-depth information 
regarding the control objectives; it is simply to gain an understanding of the relative importance of 
each objective and can thus be categorized as an exploratory study. The following subsections 
describe the sample of the study, the survey and how the data were analyzed. 
3.1 Selection of experts 
Expertise can describe skills, knowledge or talent, in tasks, activities, jobs, sport and games 
(Farrington-Darby. T., 2006). Expertise is developed over time through experience, working with 
specific practices, where the experts often are questioning, striving and hardworking individuals who 
seldom work in isolation. A thorough selection of experts based on expert criteria is important in order 
to achieve reliability and high quality of the performance of the study. In the present study the survey 
participants were strategically chosen to assure that they possessed the competence needed for the 
objectives of the study. Recommendations by Weiss and Shanteau (2003) and Shanteau (1988) on how 
to identify experts were followed.  
The experts were identified from scientific articles from searches in professional societies databases 
such as the IEEE and in pure indexing databases such as SCOPUS. The search criteria involved 
combinations of topic-words such as ”information security governance”,  “information security”, and 
”information security management” with research area delimitations such as ”IT governance” and 
”corporate governance”. 194 IT experts in the IT governance/Information security 
governance/information security domain were identified.  
3.2 The survey 
As the experts consulted in this study were widely geographically spread, a mail survey was used 
Mangione (1995). Invitations to respond to an electronic survey were sent in the spring 2010 to a 
sample of 194 IT experts. The internet-based application Relationwise hosted the survey, which was 
open for 30 days in the spring 2010. As recommended in Baxter et al. (2006) a reminder was sent to 
non-responding participants in order to increase the response rate. 
The survey consisted of eight pages of which the first according to recommendation by Blair (2005) 
gave an introduction to the survey, and a description of how to answer the questions. Furthermore, the 
first page also included questions used to assess background information of respondents. The 
following pages of the survey consisted of 30 questions utilized in order to gain information regarding 
the significance of the factors in terms of reducing negative impacts on business objective from an 
incident. All of the 30 questions included in the survey were taken directly from ISACA (2006) 
without any manipulation.  
For each of the 30 factors the respondents were asked to assess their degree of agreement with a 
statement concerning an ISG factor and its impact on the desired outcome. As the states varied from 1-
5, a five point’s likert scale was used. For each factor and its corresponding outcome respondents were 
asked to answer on a quantitative scale from 1 to 5, were 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = partly 
agree, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree 
3.3 Analysis method 
As the purpose of the research is to assess the relative importance of three or more different factors 
and identify significant difference between them, descriptive statistics combined with one-way 
ANOVA analysis is the preferred statistical analysis appropriate for the type of data Warner (2008) 
and Field (2009). The ANOVA analysis tests the null hypothesis that there doesn´t exist any 
significant differences between means of the assessed factors. ANOVA is also to be preferred in order 
to avoid type 1 errors and mass significance which is a risk using pair wise t-test Warner (2008). In the 
present study the statistical tool SPPS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was used for the 
statistical analysis. In order to identify significant differences between the assessed ISG factors the 
steps outlined in Warner (2008) and Field (2009) and interpreted by the author, are followed: 
 
1) Display descriptive statistics 
2) Run test for homogeneity of variances 
3) Run the Anova test 
4) Run multiple comparisons 
5) Interpret and report the results 
 
In the following, how each of these steps was carried out in the present study is detailed.  
 
1) Display descriptive statistics: As a first step factor means, standard deviation, standard errors, 
confidence interval, maximum and minimum values are displayed. These are also pictured in a bar 
chart with error bars indicating 95 % confidence interval around the mean. Due to this the highest 
mean value and were the variability is the lowest can be detected. 
2) Run test for homogeneity of variances: Before running the one-way ANOVA, one first needs to 
see if there exists any difference of variances between the assessed factors. For this purpose, 
Levene´s test is employed. This test is used to test the null hypothesis that the variances between 
the groups are equal (i.e. the differences between the variance is zero). If the Levene´s test is 
significant at  then one can conclude that the null hypothesis is incorrect and that the 
variances are significantly different - therefore, the assumption of homogeneity of variances has 
been violated.  
3) Run the ANOVA test: The ANOVA analysis can now be employed. ANOVA tests the null 
hypothesis that the factor means are the same, and is represented by the F-ratio for the combined 
between group effect. The F-ratio in particular stands for the variance of the group means (mean 
of the within group variances). The null hypothesis is rejected if the F ratio is large. However, if 
the significance value for the test is , the null hypothesis can be rejected (there exists a 
significant difference between mean values in the dataset) and there is a probability lower that 5% 
that the size of an F-ratio occurred by chance.  
4) Pair wise multiple comparisons: If it is determined that differences exist among the means, i.e. the 
null hypothesis is incorrect, thus the variances are significantly different, multiple comparison are 
to be employed. Multiple comparisons gives the differences of means for all possible pair of 
means and identifies means that differentiate from others with a p value at the 0.05 level. From 
these tests factors with significant higher or lower mean value according to expert opinions can de 
identified.  
5) Interpret and report the results: Questions to be answered to interpret the results are the 
following: What factor means differ from each other? Which factors scores the highest and lowest 
mean values? The test for homogeneity of variances, the results from the ANOVA analysis, with 
the details on the F-ratio and the degree of freedom from which it was calculated from are and the 
results from the multiple comparisons to identify significant higher and lower means are to be 
reported. 
4 Results and discussions 
Out of 194 respondents (experts from academia) that were invited to the survey, 46 respondents began 
it, and 22 completed it. Thus the response rate for this study is 11.34 %. Since now study of this kind 
has yet been performed in the ISG domain it is difficult to see how this response rate stands compared 
to previous similar studied. However, according to a previous study by were email invitation were 
used, a response rate of 15% is considered to be relatively high (Ali and Green ,2009). With this in 
mind, and the fact that the ISG domain isn’t as established as the ITG domain, the author finds the 
response rate to be satisfactory. 
 
4.1 Expert opinions on ISG factors 
Descriptive statistics was used to display the relative importance of ISG factors. Figure 2 pictures 
factor mean values using bar charts with error bars with 95% confidence interval. Table 2 displays the 
mean value, Std. Deviation, Std. Error, 95% confidence interval for the mean value, minimum value, 
and maximum value. By analyzing the bar chart and the table the highest mean value and were the 
variability is the lowest was detected. 
 
Figure 2. Respondent data on factors reducing negative consequences from security incidents 
 
Levene´s test was employed to test if there significant difference among the variances existed. 
Levene´s tests the null hypothesis that the variances of the factors are the same. In this case, Levene´s 
test tested whether the variances of the 30 factors were significantly different. If Levene´s test is 
significant (i.e. the value of significance is less than 0.05) then we can say that the variances are 
significantly different. In this study Levene’s test gave a significance value for homogeneity of 
variances of, , the variances of the factors are therfore significantly different.  
 
The main ANOVA of the dataset displays whether the group means are the same. The ANOVA result 
is represented by the F-ratio for the combined between group effect. In our analysis the F-value was 
3,730. Further, there is a probability of 0.000 that an F-ratio of this size would have occurred by 
chance. The significance value comparing the factors was . So, the null hypothesis could be 
rejected (there is no difference in the mean scores with the 30 factors). As the null hypothesis could be 
rejected there exists a significant difference between mean values in the dataset. 
 
 
Table 2. Respondent data on factors reducing negative consequences from security incidents 
 
Pair wise multiple comparisons test the difference between each pair of means to determine which 
factors are responsible for the difference, and yield a matrix consisting of  
comparisons. Based on these comparisons five factors were identified have significantly different 
means at a significance level of 0.05. These are displayed in Table 2. The value of the cell in the table 
represents the difference of means between the factors that are compared. The values with an asterisk 
depict the difference of means between the compared factors (see Table 2). 
 
Lower bound Upper bound
1,110 ,237 3,28 4,26 1 5
,653 ,139 3,67 4,24 3 5
,899 ,192 3,56 4,35 2 5
,722 ,154 3,73 4,37 3 5
,959 ,204 3,17 4,02 1 5
1,006 ,215 3,74 4,63 1 5
,575 ,123 3,79 4,30 3 5
,588 ,125 3,92 4,44 3 5
,588 ,125 3,56 4,08 2 5
,722 ,154 3,73 4,37 3 5
,710 ,151 3,55 4,18 3 5
,664 ,142 3,52 4,11 3 5
,752 ,160 3,89 4,56 3 5
,560 ,119 3,89 4,38 3 5
,853 ,182 3,44 4,20 3 5
,617 ,132 3,73 4,27 3 5
,935 ,199 2,86 3,69 1 5
,869 ,185 3,39 4,16 2 5
,767 ,164 2,93 3,61 2 5
,907 ,193 2,42 3,22 1 4
,848 ,181 3,26 4,01 1 5
,740 ,158 3,17 3,83 2 5
1,008 ,215 2,96 3,86 1 5
,790 ,168 3,01 3,71 1 4
,750 ,160 3,58 4,24 2 5
,752 ,160 3,44 4,11 2 5
,750 ,160 3,58 4,24 2 5
1,162 ,248 3,76 4,79 3 6
,756 ,161 3,66 4,34 2 5
,684 ,146 3,61 4,21 3 5
,852 ,033 3,74 3,87 1 6
Minimum Maximum
95% Confidence interval for 
Mean
Std. Deviation Std. Error
 
Table 2. Pair wise multiple comparisons 
 
4.2 Discussions of the statistical analysis 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the mean scores of ISG factors assessed by experts in 
the ISG domain, on a lickert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = partly agree, 4 = agree and 
5 = strongly agree). Examination of a histogram of ISG factor scores indicated that the scores were 
approximately normally distributed and no extreme outliers were found. Prior to the ANOVA analysis, 
Levene´s test for homogeneity of variances was used to examine whether there were serious violations 
of the assumption of variance across the factors. No significant violations were found at the degrees of 
freedom which it was calculated: .The overall F-ratio for the one-way ANOVA 
was significant at an  significance level: . Thus, conclusion that 
there exist significant differences of means in the data set could be drawn. To identify which means 
that differ, all possible pairwise comparisons were made using the Tukey's HSD (Honestly Significant 
Difference) test. Based on this test conclusions on which’s ISG factors that experts assess have 
significant higher value than others could be drawn. This is summarized in table 3. 
 
 
Factor 13 17 19 20 28
1 0,455 -0,5 -0,5 -,955* 0,5
2 0,273 -0,682 -0,682 -1,136* 0,318
3 0,273 -0,682 -0,682 -1,136* 0,318
4 0,182 -0,773 -0,773 -1,227* 0,227
5 0,636 -0,318 -0,318 -0,773 0,682
6 0,045 -0,909 -0,909 -1,364* 0,091
7 0,182 -0,773 -0,773 -1,227* 0,227
8 0,045 -0,909 -0,909 -1,364* 0,091
9 0,409 -0,545 -0,545 -1,000* 0,455
10 0,182 -0,773 -0,773 -1,227* 0,227
11 0,364 -0,591 -0,591 -1,045* 0,409
12 0,409 -0,545 -0,545 -1,000* 0,455
13 -,955* -,955* -1,409* 0,045
14 0,091 -0,864 -0,864 -1,318* 0,136
15 0,409 -0,545 -0,545 -1,000* 0,455
16 0,227 -0,727 -0,727 -1,182* 0,273
17 ,955* 0 -0,455 1,000*
18 0,455 -0,5 -0,5 -,955* 0,5
19 ,955* 0 -0,455 1,000*
20 1,409* 0,455 0,455 1,455*
21 0,591 -0,364 -0,364 -0,818 0,636
22 0,727 -0,227 -0,227 -0,682 0,773
23 0,818 -0,136 -0,136 -0,591 0,864
24 0,864 -0,091 -0,091 -0,545 0,909
25 0,318 -0,636 -0,636 -1,091* 0,364
26 0,455 -0,5 -0,5 -,955* 0,5
27 0,318 -0,636 -0,636 -1,091* 0,364
28 -0,045 -1,000* -1,000* -1,455*
29 0,227 -0,727 -0,727 -1,182* 0,273
30 0,318 -0,636 -0,636 -1,091* 0,364
Factor  
28 Factor 28 has significant higher mean value than factor 20, 19 and 17 
13 Factor 13 has significant higher mean value than factor 20, 19 and 17 
20 Factor 20 has significant lower mean value than all factors except factor 5, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 
23, and 24 
Table 3. Significant stronger factors 
 
Below, the factors that scored the highest/lowest mean values and were identified to be significant 
different are discussed.  
 
Factors scoring the highest mean value: Factor 28 Minimizing the impact of security 
vulnerabilities and incidents 
Factor 28 “Minimizing the impact of security vulnerabilities and incidents” scored the highest mean 
value of all factors and significantly higher than factor 20 “The number and type of malicious code 
prevented is measured”, factor 19 “The number and type of suspected and actual access violations is 
measured”, and factor 17 “The number of incidents damaging reputation with the public is measured”. 
An explanation to this could be that this factor can be categorized as a reactive countermeasure and it 
is extremely difficult to have a successful ISG in place if the impact from security vulnerabilities and 
incidents isn’t handled effectively. Another explanation could be that the questions of the survey 
explicitly asked for expert opinions on factors reducing negative consequence from security incidents. 
 
Factors scoring the next highest mean value: Factor 13 IT continuity plans that can be executed, 
tested and maintained are developed 
Factor 13 “IT continuity plans that can be executed, tested and maintained are developed” scored the 
next highest mean value of all factors and significantly higher than factor 20 “The number and type of 
malicious code prevented is measured”, factor 19 “The number and type of suspected and actual 
access violations is measured”, and factor 17 “The number of incidents damaging reputation with the 
public is measured”. An explanation to this could be that an IT continuity plan is one of the most 
important documents to keep the IT running to support different business functions. A possible other 
explanation is related the goal of the study, i.e. assess factor that reduces negative consequences from 
security incidents. In this sense, IT contingency is the most important factor to keep the IT running to 
avoid any severe impacts on the business. 
 
Factors scoring the lowest mean value: Factor 20 The number and type of malicious code 
prevented is measured 
Factor 20 “The number and type of malicious code prevented is measured” scored the lowest mean 
value of all factors and significantly lower than all factors except factor 5 “Security incidents in 
business impact terms are defined”, factor 17 “The number of incidents damaging reputation with the 
public is measured”, factor 19 “The number and type of suspected and actual access violations is 
measured”, factor 20 “The number and type of malicious code prevented is measured”, factor 21 “The 
number and type of security incidents is measured”, factor 22 “The number and type of obsolete 
accounts is measured”, factor 23 “The number of unauthorized IP addresses, ports and traffic types 
denied is measured”, and factor 24 “The number of access rights authorized, revoked, reset or changed 
is measured”. An explanation to this could be that measuring security incidents doesn’t directly affect 
how an organization reduces negative consequences from security incidents. When measuring, any 
severe incident has by then already made an impact on the business. This is can further be seen when 
analyzing the mean values of factors concerning measurements.    
5 Conclusions and further work 
This article has further explored the ISG domain and the importance of ISG factors in particular. The 
relative impact of information security governance factors on the goal related to ISG of reducing 
negative impacts from security incidents has been examined. Factors were extracted from best-practice 
literature and data was collected trough surveying experts in the ISG domain. Ten factors were 
identified to have significant different means in relation to other factors according to an ANOVA 
analysis that was conducted. The factors “Minimizing the impact of security vulnerabilities and 
incidents” and “IT continuity plans that can be executed, tested and maintained are developed” had the 
highest mean value and score significantly higher than “The number and type of malicious code 
prevented is measured”, “The number and type of suspected and actual access violations is measured”, 
and “The number of incidents damaging reputation with the public is measured. The factors “The 
number and type of malicious code prevented is measured” scored the lowest mean value of all factors 
and significantly lower than all factors except eight factors (cf. table 3).  
Although that the study doesn’t draw any general conclusion from the results, from a practitioner’s 
point of view the results gives some indications that a manager responsible for the ISG program can 
concentrate the efforts to the factors that experts assess have the most impact on the goal of reduces 
negative impacts from security incidents. From an academic point of view, the results can be used to 
further analyze how factors included in an ISG program can be prioritized not only when acting 
reactive in the work of ensuring security, but also for preventive and detective purposes.  
Another natural continuation of the present line of research is to validate the results with case 
studies of the effect of factors in actual ISG implementations on reducing negative impacts from 
security incidents. 
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